By examining China’s strategic communication, cultural diplomacy, diaspora, and other types of engagement associated with the use of soft power, this paper aims to identify the critical dimensions of China’s soft power dynamics in Latin America, considering the legacy of past scenarios, contemporary developments, and possible future trends.

Introduction

In the past, the capacity of one or another country to achieve its goals in the international arena was measured by evaluating its “hard power,” understood as the use of force or coercion, including military force, economic sanctions, or other forms of overt pressure. In other words, “hard power” has been the more traditional and explicit exercise of power. As Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrated, some states still use hard power, particularly when short of other tools of influence. However, in contemporary international relations, wars are exceptions to the established rules of the game, and states that initiate wars are condemned by the international community and have to be prepared to assume high costs related to their behavior.

From the above perspective, China’s rise as a global economic and political powerhouse has been accompanied not by the use of hard power but by a strategic push to increase its soft power worldwide. Soft power, a concept coined by the us scholar Joseph Nye, refers to a nation’s ability to influence others through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or force. From this perspective, today’s Chinese soft power strategy is multifaceted, encompassing various elements such as culture, education, diplomacy, and economic engagement. Latin America, a diverse and resource-rich region with a growing international presence, has become a crucial arena for China’s soft power initiatives.

In addition, the evidence suggests that China is using its soft power as a “sharp power” tool to reach its specific objectives in the region. Sharp power is a concept introduced to describe a more subtle and indirect form of influence than traditional “soft” and “hard power” (Walker, 2018). Sharp power blurs the line between traditional statecraft and activities carried out by non-state actors, making it challenging to attribute responsibilities to a particular state. Hence, sharp power represents a nuanced and indirect approach to influencing other nations, distinct from the overt force of hard power and the attraction of soft power. It often involves tactics that operate in the gray areas of international relations and can be difficult to counter or attribute.

Against the above background, this paper examines China’s soft and sharp power strategies in Latin America, focusing on its motivations, mechanisms, and implications for the Latin American countries involved. By analyzing the cultural diplomacy, economic engagement, and political influence that China deploys in the region, the aim is to provide an overview of China’s multidimensional soft and sharp power dynamics in Latin America, considering the legacy of past engagement, contemporary developments, and possible future trends.

Soft Power and China’s Global Ambitions

Joseph Nye suggested (Nye, 2021) that soft power consists of three primary components: culture, political values, and foreign policies. These elements collectively contribute to a nation’s ability to shape perceptions and influence other countries without military or economic coercion. Additionally, while elements of “sharp power” related to “soft power” vary, they typically include the following elements: propaganda to shape public opinion, economic incentives to friendly countries, cultural exchange programs, state-funded media outlets, and educational initiatives to advance a specific political agenda or worldview. Besides, using “soft power” as a “sharp power” tool may involve efforts to influence think tanks, academics, journalists, and other opinion leaders in target countries through financial incentives, partnerships, or other means.

To better understand the use of soft power tools by Beijing today, it is necessary to take a closer look at the evolution of China’s presence in key international scenarios since the proclamation of the People’s Republic (prc) in 1949. In this context, during most of the second part of the 20th century, the major tasks for the People’s Republic of China’s successive governments were getting international recognition as the legitimate government of China (the claim disputed with the Republic of China’s government based in Taipei) and catching up in terms of economic development with the world leading powers. While legitimizing Beijing as the only representative of the Chinese nation in the international arena –”one China policy”– was achieved mainly by the end of the 1980s, China’s rapid economic growth has propelled it into a prominent global position over the past few decades. China has articulated its global ambitions as a rising superpower through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (bri), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (aiib), the brics block, and others, including vast foreign direct investments (fdi), which have had a significant impact on the perception of the People’s Republic by the elites and public opinion everywhere in the world, including Latin America, where prc was viewed in the past as the supporter of leftist “Maoist” rebel movements and a threat to democracy and the established political order (Rothwell, 2013).

The shift from perceiving China as a “threat” to a “partner in economic development” paved the way to acceptance by other nations of the types of engagement generally associated with using soft power: educational cooperation and cultural diplomacy, strategic communication, and growing presence of media outlets in communication space inside various regions around the world. These endeavors are integral to China’s quest for more significant influence and the wide-reaching promotion of its soft power.

China’s Soft Power Strategy in Latin America: Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy promotes a nation’s culture, values, language, and heritage to build and strengthen relationships with other countries and people. It is potent in fostering mutual understanding by building bridges between nations and is also a tool to foster the soft power of one or another state. As such, it is used by many nations. Not surprisingly, China has recognized the importance of cultural diplomacy for fomenting Beijing’s soft power as one of the ways to strengthen its global reach. As such, in recent years, China has been actively engaged in cultural diplomacy efforts in Latin America, a region rich in cultural diversity and historical significance, but also gradually becoming more open to extra-regional influence as one of the results of globalization manifested in trade liberalization, increased tourism and easiness of traveling to and from the region.

Since cultural diplomacy is a critical component of China’s soft power strategy in Latin America, it receives priority as far as specific measures by the government in Beijing are concerned. The Confucius Institutes, which have proliferated throughout the region, are central to this effort. According to the list published by the Fundacion Andres Bello, there are 44 Confucius Institutes in Latin America and the Caribbean and several so-called “Language Education Cooperation Centers” supported by the prc (Fundacion Andres Bello, n. d.). These institutes promote Chinese language learning, cultural exchanges, and academic collaboration by offering language courses, cultural events, and educational exchanges, providing Latin American students and scholars with firsthand opportunities to learn about China in a positive light.

Examining the activities carried out by the Confucius Institutes in Latin America allows some scholars to confirm that the institutes serve as platforms for China to disseminate not only knowledge about Chinese culture, history, and language but also to promote political values different to liberal democracy, fostering a more profound division in Latin American societies (Hartig, 2015). This is because being funded -even if only partially in some cases- by the Chinese state, the learning materials used in the Confucius Institutes are tools of sharp power representing only the “bright” side of today’s China, silencing the lack of fundamental human rights such as individual liberty, freedom of opinion and expression, other civil and political rights enjoyed by people in democratic countries, in addition to the growing inequalities among ordinary people in that country. As a result, for many people who attend the Confucius Institutes in Latin America, China is emerging as a “successful” alternative to liberal democracy, which has been a long-standing political choice of most American countries.

China also leverages media and entertainment to enhance its cultural influence. Chinese films, television programs, and music have gained popularity in Latin American markets, contributing to a positive image of China. Co-productions between Chinese and Latin American filmmakers have further facilitated cross-cultural exchanges. Besides, Chinese art exhibitions and museum collaborations have gained prominence in Latin America. These exhibitions display Chinese art and serve as a means of cultural diplomacy, fostering a deeper appreciation for Chinese history and artistic traditions. At the same time, however, these events do not offer opportunities to discuss the current developments and the strengthening of autocratic tendencies in China since their format does not allow such debates. Still, the opening of exhibitions is usually attended by China’s ambassadors or other officials, who do not miss the opportunity to praise today’s economic successes of this nation that they link to the political system established back in 1949. In this sense, in Latin America, China enjoys a more expansive maneuvering space than, for example, in Europe or the United States, where public opinion is much better aware of the nature of the political regime in Beijing.

Diaspora’s Engagement as a Soft Power Tool in Latin America

Knowing the exact number of Chinese descendants in Latin America is challenging. Still, scholars agree that millions of people of Chinese heritage live permanently in the region (Tan, 2013). Moreover, lately, Beijing has been showing a keen interest in engaging the diaspora globally, including Latin America, hoping the Chinese of Latin America can serve as a soft power tool for the Chinese government (Denardi, 2019). There are several reasons behind this interest. Firstly, the Chinese diaspora in Latin America often maintains strong ties with their homeland, which can lead to cultural exchanges between China and Latin American countries. This can include traditional Chinese festivals, cuisine, language classes, and cultural events that foster a deeper appreciation of Chinese culture. Besides, many members of the Chinese diaspora in Latin America are involved in business and trade. Their economic activities can help strengthen trade relations between China and Latin American nations. China can leverage these connections to expand its economic influence in the region. In addition, Chinese diaspora members involved in academia can facilitate educational and research collaborations between Chinese and Latin American institutions. This enhances China’s image as a center for learning and innovation.

At the same time, those Chinese who reside in Latin America but maintain personal and commercial ties with their homeland have severe limitations when speaking openly about things Beijing does not want to be spoken out. They are aware that criticizing China’s authorities, particularly the way the Communist Party governs the country, or pointing out the lack in China of many of the freedoms the members of the Diaspora enjoy in Latin America may result in sudden difficulties in doing business with China or even the risk of detention while visiting the homeland. Therefore, for Beijing, the diaspora serves as a perfect permanent soft power resource, which is used to shape a positive image of contemporary China, especially taking into account the fact that many members of the diaspora are well integrated into local communities and things they say are more trusted by locals that the one coming directly from China’s official communications. In this context, members of the Chinese diaspora can represent Chinese interests in Latin American politics, either being elected as political representatives or forming pressure groups advocating for policies that align with China’s objectives.

Will all roads lead to Beijing in the future?

What is behind China’s cultural diplomacy and diaspora’s engagement in Latin America? One of the primary motivations behind China’s efforts to advance its cultural diplomacy and work more extensively with the diaspora in Latin America is its ever-expanding regional economic presence. China has become a significant trade partner for many Latin American countries. Investments in infrastructure, energy, and natural resources accompany this trend. By fostering cultural ties, China aims to create a more favorable environment for its economic activities, thus ensuring the stability of its investments and access to resources. Nevertheless, while the aim of improving the reception of China as a trade partner and a major foreign investor via soft power can be considered legitimate, China’s cultural diplomacy in Latin America can also be seen as a challenge to the democratic traditions in the region. Latin Americans share these traditions with Western countries, but the West does not own them. These traditions are Latin American to the same degree as they are European or of the United States. In this sense, it would be wrong to view the use of soft power by China as an attempt to counterbalance the historical influence of Western countries in the region only. By counter-positioning non-democratic values to liberal democracy as an alternative path to economic success, China seeks not only to diminish the dominance of Western institutions and liberal world order but also to recruit governments and people of Latin America to support its new global initiatives that aim at redesigning the architecture of future world order.

China seeks […] to recruit governments and people of Latin America to support its new global initiatives that aim at redesigning the architecture of future world order.

As China’s influence in Latin America continues to grow, Beijing is convinced that projecting a positive image of the country among the elites and public opinion must accompany this process. Cultural diplomacy and diaspora engagement allow China to present itself as a cultural and intellectual powerhouse, not just an economic one. This contributes to a more appealing image of China in the eyes of Latin American nations and diminishes the value of the fact-based critique by the Western countries of human rights violations by China and the lack of fundamental freedoms, transparency, and accountability of the Chinese authorities. In the context of the decline of the support for democracy as the preferred form of government in many parts of the world, China has emerged as a new solid reference for another way of “doing politics” thanks to the successful use of soft power.

Judging by the latest developments, including the expansion of the brics by inclusion- among others- of new members from Latin America and the absence of China’s leaders at the 2023 G-20 meeting, there is little doubt that the struggle to establish new rules in the international arena has intensified. Hence, given the geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of Latin America in the Western hemisphere, it is likely that from China’s perspective, in the future, all major political and economic roads from the region should lead to Beijing. The success of this endeavor depends on many factors, and it is too early to insist on one or another definite outcome of China’s policies toward Latin America. What is certain is that it is an ongoing process in which Beijing does rely on the use of its soft power. Besides, it is already possible to evaluate the current impact of China’s soft power in the region.

Impact of China’s Soft Power in Latin America

In recent years, China’s cultural diplomacy efforts have contributed to the emergence of a view that Latin Americans today understand Chinese culture, values, and society much better than at the beginning of the 21st century. Nevertheless, while it is true that there is an increased awareness that has reduced cultural misunderstandings and stereotypes, China remains an enigma for the majority of the region’s elites and public opinion, at least if compared with the level of cultural awareness of Latin Americans regarding the United States and Europe.

The proliferation of Confucius Institutes and Chinese language courses did result in an increased number of Latin Americans learning Mandarin. Even so, the number of people who have mastered Mandarin to the degree that it now serves as the linguistic bridge facilitating communication and strengthening ties between the two regions remains low. Similarly, although cultural exchanges created a two-way flow of ideas and creativity, and Latin American culture -including music, dance, and cuisine- has found its place in China, enriching the cultural landscape in both regions, the impact of these developments on overall cultural ties between the two regions is small.

China did achieve something else, however. Thanks to the skillful use of soft power tools, it has built a quite positive image of this country in Latin America, which -despite having a political system that differs from a liberal democracy- has managed to become a true superpower that rivals the United States and the developed countries of Western Europe. The ambiguity of the image of China, which for current Latin America is neither a complete stranger nor a thoroughly familiar acquaintance, perfectly serves the strategic interests of the Asian giant. In particular, cultural diplomacy initiatives will likely indirectly bolster economic ties. At the same time, a more positive perception of China has encouraged business partnerships, trade agreements, and investments between China and Latin American nations.

Many more people hold a favorable view of China in Latin America than in Europe and the United States (Silver et al., 2023) since here there is no solid public discussion of the gray areas of China’s development and political models, which are often praised by the governments of the new pink tide who view Beijing’s role in the region as the answer to their aspirations to cut ties with the United States and other Western powers. A positive image of China facilitates those leaders to avoid any noteworthy public questioning of the policies that seek to establish dependency links to Beijing.

China’s Soft Power in Latin America: Challenges and Opportunities

China’s soft power initiatives in Latin America represent a multifaceted approach to strengthening cultural ties, enhancing mutual understanding, and expanding its regional influence. These efforts have yielded positive results since political and economic collaboration can partly be attributed to the success of cultural diplomacy, diaspora engagement, positive media coverage, and strategic communication. However, China’s soft power is facing several challenges.

Firstly, as China continues to engage in cultural diplomacy and advance its strategic communication in Latin America, it must balance between the efforts to advance its cultural and political values in the region and respecting the political openness of Latin American societies and their commitment to human rights. As a result, to a large extent, Beijing has managed to avoid the emergence of broad public debates on the pros and cons of doing business with China. In this way, China is building enduring bridges of cooperation with its Latin American counterparts, fostering a more sustainable modus operandi suitable to accommodate uncertain future scenarios in which it aspires to play a decisive role.

At the same time, China’s soft power strategy in Latin America does include political influence, both at the bilateral and regional levels. China engages in diplomatic efforts, including high-level visits, to strengthen its relationships with Latin American governments. In particular, China fosters diplomatic alliances with individual countries and regional organizations like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (celac). These alliances often involve discussions on global issues, such as climate change and international governance, in which China seeks to present itself as a responsible global actor whose policies are based on values different from the ones promoted by the West but “suitable” –according to Beijing– to build “mutually beneficial relations.” Similarly, China provides political support to many developing countries (including Latin America) in international forums like the United Nations, positioning itself as a non-intervening power guided by a traditional Confucian approach and “millennium-old” values (Song et al., 2023).

Last but not least, China’s soft power efforts in Latin America can be seen as a way to counterbalance the influence of the United States and other Western powers in the region. By presenting political values different from liberal democracy as a viable alternative to political organization, China challenges not only the Democratic Charter of the Americas but also the security in the region since the prevalence of like-minded democracies is the key to the stability in the Western Hemisphere: democracies do not go into war with each other. Hence, expanding China’s soft power in Latin America has added a new dimension to China’s competition with the West. The tensions are rising, and there is a call for responsible actors from inside and outside Latin America to understand better the impact of China’s soft power in this part of the world.

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