Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 forced a realist turn in Europe. The Russia-China strategic rapprochement has advanced the eu’s appetite to rebalance eu-China relations. Yet, questions remain as to whether member states have the political will to reconceptualize such ties. Is this the end of an era for eu-China relations?
Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 has forced Europe toward a more realist foreign policy. Europe is undergoing a process of strategic adjustment, one that China’s political support for Russia has accelerated, increasing the bloc’s appetite to rebalance cooperation with China. Beijing and Moscow openly pledged to shape a new world order, strengthening fears across the European Union (eu) that the two are rewriting the rules of the game. As one of China’s most important trade partners and the world’s largest trading bloc, in principle, the eu is well-positioned to play a more relevant role in upholding the rules-based order.
In practice, however, with a fragmented and often inconsistent foreign policy, the eu has failed to secure a balanced relationship with China, although China has indeed increased its footprint in Europe. This paper explores the impact of China’s strategic partnership with Russia on the eu’s political will to rebalance eu-China ties. It first assesses the state of eu-China relations by exploring the European discourse and the practical policy outcomes. Then, it explores the main elements of the Russia-China strategic partnership and how it has affected eu-China relations. The paper argues that China’s support of Russia was a watershed moment in eu-China relations. Still, questions remain as to whether this momentum will secure a sustainable shift in the eu’s approach to China.
Beijing has been working on shaping international developments by using its economic weight strategically, undermining democracy as a viable system for economic prosperity. Through its initiatives, namely the Global Security Initiative (gsi), the Global Civilisation Initiative (gci), and the Global Development Initiative (gdi), Beijing has aimed to amplify China’s global voice. The gsi contains China’s core principles of diplomacy, including the importance of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and opposition to unilateral sanctions. It is an attempt to lay out Xi Jinping’s vision of global governance.
A new geopolitical reality
On March 10, 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced the normalization of ties brokered by China, with a joint trilateral statement reflecting the intention “to resume diplomatic relations between them and re-open their embassies and missions within a period not exceeding two months.” Beijing has apparently set a new precedent in Chinese foreign policy by taking on the mantle of an “international mediator,” just as the international community is looking for a solution to Russian aggression. Following the deal, China’s top official for foreign affairs, Wang Yi, said the dialogue was a successful application of China’s Global Security Initiative (gsi), adding that China would continue to be a constructive player in promoting the proper handling of global issues.
That same month, while on a state visit to Moscow, Xi Jinping said China was ready “to stand guard over the world order based on international law” alongside Russia. This declaration occurred just days after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against Russia’s Vladimir Putin. While at the Kremlin, Xi praised Putin’s “strong leadership,” asserting that the two neighbors have the responsibility “to promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind” and support each other on issues of core interest. The Chinese foreign ministry confirmed the visit was meant to “show support for Vladimir Putin.”
The deepening of the China-Russia strategic partnership (as displayed through Xi’s Moscow visit) has amplified fears in Europe and among its like-minded partners about the implications concerning global governance. At the 2023 nato summit, a consensus emerged among allies that the mutually reinforcing attempts by Russia and China to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to nato member countries’ values and interests. nato’s message, echoed by the participation of leaders from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea at the summit, was that the security of Europe and the security of Asia are intertwined. The summit communiqué pointed towards a ramping up of competition at the expense of cooperation to address global challenges. The strengthening of the Russia-China friendship also reflects a growing opposition to the international order based on principles accepted by all, advocating instead for an order based on the will of the strongest.
Power shifts in the Indo-Pacific
Years before Russia and China commited to a “no limits” friendship in 2022, Europeans had already grown anxious about China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific – and globally. Notwithstanding differences within the eu concerning China, the eu leadership perceives Beijing’s foreign policy as inconsistent with its claims of playing a constructive role in the world. China’s sovereignty claims and maritime disputes in the South and East China seas, and its willingness to use military and economic coercion to intimidate its neighbors, have nourished fears that China is threatening a free and open Indo-Pacific. China has pursued militarization in the region by building bases and using them to intimidate Southeast Asian coastal states, thus undermining their right to exercise sovereignty under international law. According to the eu, Beijing’s assertiveness signals an intention to impose its own will on the region at the expense of theirs.
The concept of the Indo-Pacific has spurred East and Southeast Asian allies and partners to join regional and minilateral efforts for cooperation, such as the Quad, involving the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. Despite efforts to balance security and trade considerations, such formats are now shaping the architecture of security in the region. The eu joined international efforts to ensure regional security with its own 2021 Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. “The Indo-Pacific is a very important part of the world for us. It is the future, where the world’s centre of gravity is moving, both in geo-economic and geo-political terms,” said the eu High Representative Josep Borrell. The Strategy also noted tensions around contested territories and maritime zones, with a significant military build-up, “including by China.”
The document revealed a strategic awakening in the eu, indicative of the member states’ willingness to reconsider their approach to the region. The eu has started reassessing the risks of doing business with China, with de-risking as their new objective, as put forward by the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen in March 2023. The Strategy also stated that “the display of force and increasing tensions in regional hotspots such as in the South and East China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity.” This focus has enabled framing Taiwan as a like-minded partner on its own merit rather than seeing it exclusively through the eu-China lens. Going forward, how the eu manages its relations with Beijing will shape its future in the Indo-Pacific.
eu and China, systemic rivals
In navigating eu-China cooperation amid geopolitical challenges, “systemic rivalry” has become the dominant dimension of the eu’s discourse on China. In 2019, the European Commission labeled China a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” Throughout the pandemic, Beijing used mask and vaccine diplomacy to improve its global image at the expense of democracy, intensifying fears across Europe about China’s global influence.
In June 2020, for the first time, Brussels named China, along with Russia, as a source of disinformation linked to the coronavirus and aimed at undermining Western democracies, sowing internal divisions and projecting a distorted view of China’s response to the pandemic. China has continued to use its economic and military power to advance its interests, including deepening its strategic partnership with Russia. In the words of the Commission president, “how China continues to interact with Putin’s war will be a determining factor for eu-China relations going forward.” This statement reveals the extent to which China’s unwillingness to condemn the aggression shapes European perceptions of China. eu-China relations have hit a new low point in an ongoing deterioration that has unfolded for years.
The long list of grievances
The factors that have accelerated the deterioration in bilateral ties include China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which resulted in Brussels imposing sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for these violations in 2021. In retaliation, China imposed countersanctions on Members of the European Parliament (meps) and European scholars, which led to the European Parliament condemning the arbitrary sanctions and freezing ratification talks on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (cai) with China.
European legislators urged the Commission to take the human rights situation in China – as well as in Hong Kong – into account when deciding whether to endorse the agreement or not. They also stressed that other trade and investment agreements with regional partners, including Taiwan, should not be held hostage by the suspension of the cai ratification, signaling the legislators’ understanding of Taiwan’s strategic relevance.
For the first time, Brussels promoted the issue of cross-Strait relations on its agenda while upholding its commitment to “pursue its multifaceted engagement with China.” The eu acknowledged that China’s display of force in the Taiwan Strait “may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity.” In October 2021, in their first stand-alone report on Taiwan, meps urged considering Taiwan “a key partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific on its own merit, as a robust democracy and technologically advanced economy that could contribute to maintaining a rules-based order in the middle of an intensifying great power rivalry.”
When trade becomes a weapon
Closer to home, China’s economic coercion against Lithuania was yet another wake-up call for Europe to understand its vulnerabilities. In 2021, Lithuania left the 16/17+1 cooperation framework with China and decided instead to expand cooperation with Taiwan, a decision driven by national security concerns. Vilnius allowed Taiwan to open a “Taiwanese” office in the country (breaking with the practice of naming it the “Taipei office”) and opened a Lithuanian representative office in Taipei.
In response, Beijing downgraded Lithuania’s ambassador in Beijing to chargé d’affaires. “There are so many ways China can teach Lithuania a lesson,” the Global Times, China’s state media, warned. Beijing halted cargo trains en route to the Baltic country and deleted – and soon after reinstated – Lithuania from its customs registry. This situation compelled the eu to act, requesting the intervention of the wto. It also accelerated eu efforts to establish its own anti-coercion tool. Consequently, in 2021, it proposed an Anti-Coercion Instrument that allows for countermeasures against third countries that seek to use trade for political objectives, expected to work as a deterrent.
The hawkish shift in European perceptions has been noticeable not only in the narrative but also in a willingness to adopt defensive measures to protect European interests. The Commission regularly discusses the collective threats posed by China – economically, technologically, and politically. While reaching a consensus has remained challenging, Europe is reconsidering its geopolitical position in the world, and China is central to these reflections. Member states have converged around the need to de-risk cooperation – rather than decoupling. As the Commission president elaborated, bilateral relations have become “unbalanced and increasingly affected by distortions created by China’s state capitalist system,” adding that the eu doesn’t want to cut economic, societal, political, or scientific ties with China, which remains a “vital trading partner.” De-risking entails the eu strengthening the strategic sectors in which it is too reliant on China.
The eu strikes back
The Commission has identified key assets in its critical infrastructure, including energy, transport, or digital connectivity, that remain vulnerable and face threats. Hence, since 2020, the eu has used a framework for foreign investment screening. This eu-level mechanism was designed to review incoming investment in critical areas of infrastructure on national security grounds, with the Commission playing a coordinating role. fdi screening in the eu remains the task of member states, and the regulation does not equip eu institutions with the legal competency to apply screening to any inbound investment. Instead, it enables the Commission to issue opinions to member states regarding any planned, completed, or undergoing screening. It is up to member states to consider said opinion. The value of the mechanism lies in establishing a coordination framework rather than an eu-level screening authority.
This tool was part of the eu’s response to geopolitical competition for critical resources and strategic assets. With its Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed in 2023, the eu seeks to become less reliant on Chinese refining capacities, introducing a set of actions to ensure the eu’s access to a secure, diversified, affordable, and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, which are indispensable for strategic sectors, namely the net zero industry and the digital industry. Public procurement and market access are issues that have further burdened eu-China relations. The European side has for years expressed concerns that its companies face difficulties in accessing Chinese public procurement, while Chinese companies have guaranteed access to European public procurement.
With its International Public Procurement Policy (ipi), adopted in June 2022, the eu seeks to achieve reciprocity and improve market access opportunities for its companies. This instrument aims to support a more assertive trade policy in response to trade conflicts – with China, but also with the United States. According to eu Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis, it is designed to give the eu “extra leverage to remove barriers and promote fair competition for the benefit of all.”
Not choosing sides
The increasing geostrategic tension between the us and China has forced the eu to secure a better position while avoiding choosing sides. China’s global assertiveness in reshaping global governance to benefit its interests – including its support for the Russian aggression – has accelerated Europe’s geostrategic adjustment. Yet, notwithstanding strong language on China and its defensive measures, as a trade partner, China remains in fact an important consideration for the eu, making de-risking difficult.
For most member states, trade with China remains significant. Some, namely Germany, have their own China strategy. Others, such as Hungary, prefer keeping China as a close partner while ensuring that it doesn’t play a prominent role in their domestic agenda. Member states are not aligned when it comes to China. Fragmentation in the European bloc persists on several levels: between member states, between eu institutions, and between Brussels and member states. Research shows that approaches towards China vary depending on the intensity of ties, the extent of economic dependence, and attitudes towards the authoritarian government in China.
At the same time, China considers Europe a crucial partner in its quest for global influence, particularly as it finds access to American technology evermore restricted. eu-China cooperation is vital for Beijing, and access to Europe’s research and development will become even more relevant. Yet, China’s aggressive posturing has forced eu member states to gradually converge in their perception of a threat and their support for a renewed bilateral engagement. China’s strategic alignment with Russia has been a catalyst in bringing an era of business as usual with China to an end.
Russia and China, “no forbidden areas of cooperation”
China’s political support for Russia has complicated European efforts to isolate Moscow. The eu acted fast by adopting sanctions, with eleven packages agreed since the start of the aggression. The latest round of said packages focuses on combating the circumvention of pre-existing trade sanctions rather than introducing new bans. The eu warned Beijing about this precisely at the 2022 eu-China summit: “We expect China, if not supporting the sanctions, at least to do everything not to interfere in any kind.” The Commission president declared that if China supported Russia’s ability to wage war, “it would lead to a major reputational damage for China here in Europe.”
Regarding Russia’s war against Ukraine, the goal has remained clear: “to make sure that Putin’s war of choice will fail.” Strategic clarity has strengthened across Europe regarding the need to equip the bloc with defensive tools and show the political will to act. The eu has remained united in the face of aggression, Ukraine has strengthened its democracy, and Russia has become more isolated. nato is more united than ever, while China has struggled to position itself strategically; by supporting Putin, Xi Jinping has deepened the tensions with the eu.
While Beijing has tried to distance itself from Russia, the latter has become its biggest oil supplier, with Moscow selling discounted oil to Beijing amid sanctions. Russia even displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s biggest oil provider. These developments convinced many in Europe that Beijing was not distancing itself from Moscow and that its neutrality claims regarding the war contradicted reality. In their “no limits” friendship, established twenty days before Russia invaded Ukraine, Moscow and Beijing claimed they would seek “true multilateralism” in a cooperation model that “surpasses an alliance.”
Moscow’s key security policy objective has been to secure a global role by disrupting European security architecture and forcing the negotiation of a new structure. Russia has also pushed for a strategic decoupling between Europe and the us. Closer ties with Beijing have helped Moscow to project the image of a globally connected, not isolated Russia.
China as a peacemaker?
The strategic coordination between China and Russia is in reality a continuing and consistent consolidation of bilateral ties, bolstered since the end of the Cold War. The relationship has gone from good neighborliness in the 1990’s to a comprehensive strategic partnership in the early 2000’s, upgrading into “a comprehensive strategic partnership of equality, mutual trust, mutual support, common prosperity and long-lasting friendship”, and then turning into a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”
In March 2023, the two sides pointed out that, regarding Ukraine, “the legitimate security concerns of all countries must be respected.” This declaration was in line with China’s position paper calling for the “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”, which suggested that the only viable solutions to the “crisis” were dialogue and negotiation. Russia, in exchange, committed to support China’s sovereignty claims over Taiwan. China, in turn, has acknowledged that Russia had “legitimate security concerns”, denouncing the United States as the main culprit. This rhetorical alignment has substantiated European doubts, even though the eu initially hoped China could play a mediating role.
China repeatedly attempted to portray itself as a peacemaker but did little to convince Europeans that it would play a constructive role in stopping the Russian aggression. The eu dismissed Beijing’s ‘peace plan’ as a “political initiative” that applied a biased interpretation of international law: “The position paper doesn’t take into account who is the aggressor and who is the victim of an illegal, unjustified war of aggression.”
Beijing’s vision of global governance
For China, Russian defeat in Ukraine is not a desirable outcome as this would mean a victory for the liberal international order and undermine the pursuit of an alternative governance model. It would also weaken the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy concerning unification with Taiwan. In contrast, a victorious Russia, one that remains a junior partner for China, would serve Beijing’s interests. Therefore, Beijing has big stakes in Russia not losing, which renders its claims to be a neutral mediator questionable. China has benefited from Russia’s direct attack on democracy.
gsi and gdi are closely linked, based on the Chinese Marxist belief that security is a prerequisite for development and development is a guarantee for security. gci promotes a state-defined values system, in an attempt to eliminate universal values, including human rights and democracy. These initiatives are ultimately designed to support “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” incomplete without unification with Taiwan. Overall, China’s military modernization has improved the capability of its armed forces. Right now, China has the largest navy and air force in Asia and the largest coast guard in the world, and it is a grand aid donor and lender in the Indo-Pacific. While its toolbox of incentives and coercion supported by information manipulation has had mixed results in terms of influence, there is no sign of Beijing’s willingness to play a constructive global role that would protect, rather than undermine, democracy.
Conclusion
Dealing with an aggressive Russia has united Europe. However, regarding China, eu member states are not aligned. Despite their persistent divergence, China’s support for Russia has deepened European awareness of its vulnerabilities and accelerated efforts to rebalance ties with China. Europe now links the security of the Euro-Atlantic with that of the Indo-Pacific, a sentiment that resonates in the region. “The security of Europe and of the Indo-Pacific is inseparable. Russian aggression against Ukraine is not a problem for Europe alone, but instead an outrageous act that undermines the very foundation of the international order,” said Japan’s Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, at the 2022 nato summit.
In 2020, eu High Representative Borrell stated that the eu must face the question of how it should deal with China pursuing a global influence strategy and determine its own role. These, said Borrell, are both issues of fundamental importance for Europe’s future. In 2023, China’s global clout remains crucial and will shape Europe’s role in the twenty-first century. The question, however, remains as to whether member states will have the political will to reconceptualize ties with China with a coherent and credible eu strategy. Is this the beginning of a new era in eu-China relations?
References
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Karaskova I, et al. (2022, May). Backing Russia on Ukraine: China’s Messaging in Central and Eastern Europe. China Observers. https://chinaobservers.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/CHOICE_policy-paper_Backing-Russia-on-Ukraine_04_web.pdfSchuman M, Fulton J, & Gering T (2023, junio 21). How Beijing’s newest global initiatives seek to remake the world order. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-beijings-newest-global-initiatives-seek-to-remake-the-world-order/
