Summary
In the era of geopolitical conflicts, the question of a successful recalibration of China policy arises. Competition with the communist leadership in Beijing requires improving one’s knowledge of China and strengthening one’s own brilliance. To convince others, one has to convince one’s own players at home.
It’s September 2013, a balmy late summer evening in the heart of Shanghai. The restaurants and bars in the central district of Jing’an are quite full. There is a palpable sense of lightness among the young people, reminiscent of years past in China when the country’s economy surged at almost double-digit rates. Optimism was the hallmark of the country and many dared to try something new. Despite the authoritarian reins with which the ccp firmly shaped the country, delegation after delegation visited China to strengthen bilateral ties. Agreements were signed, a high degree of mutual respect and commitment shaped the relations, guided by the overall aim of contributing to the prosperity of their respective societies.
Nearly a decade later, the global public opinion towards China has undergone a fundamental shift. The official Communist Party narrative attributes this change to “ideological thinking” among Western political countries, claiming they are “influenced by the US and aim to curb China’s global growth”.
This narrative, however, overlooks that China under Xi Jinping has embarked on a course that increasingly portrays the West as an adversary. China seeks to counter universalist claims with its own values, ideas and norms. Under this premise, Chinese interests are pursued based on a logic that views a weakened West as necessary to ensure a favourable environment in which China can safely operate. Many aspects align with this core idea: China’s trade and industrial policies, its geo-economic and geopolitical strategies, and China’s military trajectory.
Under this premise, how can we deal with the communist leadership in Beijing, a leadership that frequently asserts a commitment to providing ‘global public goods’, particularly to countries in the Global South? What about our values and ideas when they may no longer align with those held by many members of the international community (not the societies themselves, but their respective political leaderships)? And where is it crucial to take firm stance to show China the limits of its revisionist actions and prevent the deterioration of an increasingly unstable international order?
The phrase “China has changed, therefore our policy towards China must also change” opens the German Strategy on China, released in July 2023. This sentiment is shared by large segments of the political spectrum in Western democracies, and serves as a helpful starting point for our deliberations on China.
China can be a partner in those areas where the world needs initiatives to jointly address common challenges. Specifically, in fields like healthcare, innovation, and the provision of sustainable solutions to enhance individuals’ livelihoods -such as by comprehensively reducing co2 emissions. In a nutshell, we can best work together in areas which are not limited to national challenges and where we need to find long-term solutions that benefit global wellbeing. In general, a partnership is realistic if national interests and the mere pursuit of competitive advantages do not supersede the intent to cooperate.
However, as non-state resources increasingly align with serving national and party interests, the landscape grows more complex.
The economic focus on diversification strategies, widely debated in the European context under the term ‘de-risking’; the creation of a risk matrix to assess developments in the Chinese environment; and the broader general objective of building resilient supply chains, all point to a direction where private entities interact in an even more risk-prone international environment. In a changing political landscape, market economies must delineate industrial policies that do not prioritize protectionism, but instead provide a set of tools to compete against heavily subsidised counterparts. This could involve establishing screening mechanisms and adopting new policy instruments. Building resilience on a political level also involves considering steps rooted in a clear set of guidelines that could eventually escalate the costs for any potential retaliatory measures.
Strengthening one’s resilience must become a benchmark for any interaction with China. China has risen to become a leading force in discourse. Domestically, China achieves this because there are hardly any spaces for critical discourse on its sensitive internal developments. However, this by no means makes the Chinese system a superior one. On the contrary: China’s vulnerabilities become more visible as the flow of information becomes less transparent. To engage with China on equal footing, the fear of confrontation needs to be abandoned, and even more, a renewed sense is required to unequivocally label wrongdoing as such. This particularly applies to China’s direct and indirect support for Russia and Iran.
China must be convinced that the anti-Western course that is being pursued in many policy fields, and reflected in China’s foreign policy behaviour, directly undermines Europe’s and many global partners fundamental interests. This also requires addressing own interests vis-à-vis Chinese interlocutors much more clearly. Through dialogue programmes, enhanced proficiency in Chinese language, and the will to openly address disputes.
In the age of geopolitical conflict, enhancing expertise on China becomes a necessary requirement highlighting the need for a clear direction. Injustice remains unjust. Upholding what’s right and strengthening one’s radiance remains the essence of competitiveness. To convince others you have to convince your players at home. This also applies to everyone seeking a sense of lightness for themselves and their country, keeping an optimistic vision for the future – just like the many young people in Shanghai.
