This article links the increase in repression under current Chinese leader Xi Jinping to his drive for political control, party supremacy, and ideology. It highlights a number of areas where repression has intensified and concludes that the situation will not improve without a major ideological shift.
When China first hosted the Olympic Games in 2008, the country was looking forward to a better, more liberal future – perhaps. The Games were an opportunity for China to show itself to the world in the best possible light.
They took place during Hu Jintao’s second term (2003-2013), which was already marked by a return to ideology. Hu also rolled back the economic and legal reforms of his predecessors, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin (Shirk, 2018). However, the Games could still be considered a success for China, even though the government largely reneged on its promises to improve social conditions, human rights, and media freedom, among other things. Brutal crackdowns on peaceful demonstrations in Tibet, tighter visa requirements, restrictions on international journalists, and media censorship surrounded this global event.
China in a “New Era”
In 2012, just before Xi Jinping officially came to power, it was difficult to say whether he was more of a reformer or a revisionist. Today, in his third term, nothing is clearer: Xi is a hardliner, prioritizing ideology and political control over economic and social development. Xi’s “new era” has seen the introduction of a series of policies, laws, and regulations that underline a clear and pronounced anti-liberal stance, reinforcing the ideological drive that began under his predecessor Hu while intensifying repression and human rights abuses (Shirk, 2018).
Seguridad nacional e intensificación de la represión
One lens through which to interpret the introduction of new laws and regulations under Xi, and thus the increased suppression of previously existing freedoms in China, is Xi’s primary focus on “comprehensive national security” (zongti guojia anquan 总体国家安全). He introduced this concept in 2014, at the beginning of his first term. Since then, it has become a core element of his approach to governance, encompassing every conceivable area that needs to be securitized – a “securitization of everything” (Drinhausen & Legarda, 2022).
The most important area is political security, i.e., maintaining regime stability and guaranteeing the Party’s supremacy. This primary security objective is achieved through another fifteen areas, ranging from territorial security to resource and ecological security, economic, cultural and societal security, and cyber security, to name a few. The concept is accompanied by corresponding laws that have been implemented to defend against a number of perceived threats, such as terrorism/separatism, US military and technological dominance, ideological issues related to Western values, and organized religions, among others.
New laws for more control
Some of the new laws introduced under Xi mainly give security organs more power and access to restricted facilities, private records, and personnel, such as the Counter-Espionage Law (2014, renewed in 2023) or the Cybersecurity Law (2016). While these are primarily defensive in nature, other laws require the active participation of individuals and companies in the overarching national security project. For example, the obligation to report national security threats to state security agencies under the National Security Law (2015) or to assist security agencies in carrying out intelligence work, as in the National Intelligence Law (2017) (Tanner, 2017).
The problem with all these laws is that the terminology and definition of what constitutes a national security threat remain vague. Thus, these laws can be easily exploited and used against Chinese citizens to further restrict their rights and freedoms. Ordinary Chinese citizens could also easily be used by the state for espionage.
Other laws, such as the Counter-Terrorism Law (2015), have led to an increased build-up of military and security structures, particularly in the regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, under the supposedly justified threat of terrorism and separatism in these regions. However, this alleged threat is based on a deliberate equation of the expression of religious and ethnic identities with “separatism.” It also equates peaceful dissent with acts of violence, in which case security measures are indeed justified. Thus, this law serves as a justification for cracking down on ethnic and religious expression and has been widely used in this context (fidh, 2016).
Similarly, the implementation of the Overseas ngo Management Law (2016) stifled the international ngo landscape and impact, as overseas ngos since then have been required to register with the Ministry of Public Security and partner with either a Chinese sponsor organization or a professional supervisory unit (Holbig & Lang, 2022).
Laws such as the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Data Security Law (2021), among others, have enabled the Chinese government to better control public opinion on the internet, how data is collected and stored by organizations operating in China, and have made it much easier to access this data (including from foreign companies) in the event of investigations (Tanner, 2017).
But Xi’s drive for national security is not limited to the Chinese mainland. Despite the agreement on a 50-year transition period at the time of the Hong Kong handover, the central government in Beijing has increasingly interfered with Hong Kong’s political autonomy. On June 30, 2020, Beijing imposed a separate national security law on the city-state: the Hong Kong National Security Law (hknsl). It was a response to protests, notably the Occupy Central movement (2014), which was pushing for more democracy, and protests over a planned extradition treaty with mainland China (2019-2020). The introduction of the law had a far-reaching effect on the freedoms previously enjoyed in Hong Kong, essentially silencing any dissent.
The Ideology behind Xi’s Drive for Political Control
The ideological backbone of all these measures is Document No. 9. Originally an internal communication, it was circulated by the General Office of the ccp in April 2013. The document lists seven risks to national stability and development as perceived by the ccp. These include Western-style constitutional democracy with a multi-party system, elections, and an independent judiciary; universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights; civil society; a neo-liberal market economy; and media and press freedom. According to the ccp, these dangerous ideas are being spread by so-called “anti-China forces” and dissidents who are trying to infiltrate China’s ideological sphere, which the ccp must guard against (ChinaFile, 2013).
This document foreshadowed the numerous crackdowns that were soon to follow and the tightening of China’s security apparatus through “comprehensive national security.”
How the ccp’s Document No. 9 Led to More Repression
Of course, Xi is not the first Chinese leader to seek to control the cultural and social spheres of Chinese society, to reinforce ideology, to reject Western notions of democracy, freedom, and human rights, and to see any threat in terms of so-called “anti-Chinese forces” and infiltration. These have been constant concerns of the ccp since Mao, with varying responses and intensity, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen protests and massacre by the Chinese military. What makes Xi’s approach different is indeed its broad, comprehensive scope and a clearly articulated ideological basis, as in Document No. 9.
So how has Document No. 9 been translated into reality, and what is the role of cultural and social security in this? The purpose of cultural and societal security is to “avert danger before it materializes” (Drinhausen & Legarda, 2022). Cultural security aims to prevent the harmful influence of (Western) ideologies and thought and, thus, focuses on suppressing support for human rights and freedom of expression — values clearly condemned in Document No. 9. Repression also extends to religious communities and spiritual movements because their beliefs challenge the Party’s ideological guidance.
Societal security aims to control society and prevent collective action such as public gatherings and protests. This particularly affects local Chinese ngos and activism, but also any state-independent journalism.
On the following pages, various examples illustrate the repression fueled by cultural and social security.
The crackdown on religious communities: Falun Gong, Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uyghurs
The first crackdowns on Falun Gong took place in the late 1990s. The spiritual movement, founded in 1992, taught specific meditation practices and Qi Gong-style exercises. It attracted a growing number of followers. Members often practiced in public places. In April 1999, a group of about 10,000 practitioners gathered outside the ccp compound in Zhongnanhai. It was a peaceful protest in response to the continued harassment and arbitrary detention of practitioners. This mass protest triggered a massive crackdown. Since then, the ccp perceived Falun Gong as a threat to political and social stability, branded it a “heretical organization” (xiejiao zuzhi 邪教组织), and officially banned it in July of that year. Propaganda campaigns to smear the movement followed. Members have been arbitrarily detained, forced to renounce their beliefs, tortured, and ill-treated. Falun Gong has still not been rehabilitated.
Repression of religious communities was then extended to Buddhism in the Tibet Autonomous Region (tar) and Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (xuar).
Repression in the tar had already become more concrete under Hu’s rule. Tibet was incorporated into Communist China under Mao in 1951 and became the TAR in 1965, losing some parts to Chinese provinces. In 2008, the ccp resorted to massive repression when Tibetan monks staged their annual protest march to commemorate the 1959 uprising. In response to the crackdown, some 150 or more peaceful protests broke out across the Tibetan plateau and other Tibetan-populated provinces, which the government put down with massive security forces. According to Chinese official records, four Tibetans were killed, while the Tibetan community claims at least 100 were killed. Security forces remained in the monasteries for months, and many Tibetans were interrogated, arrested, and detained.
Repression intensified under Tibet Party Secretary Chen Quanguo (2012-2016). He introduced a series of security and surveillance measures, such as the structuring of urban centers into grids for systematic surveillance by so-called “convenience police stations” with 24-hour patrols. He also introduced a system of encouraging people to spy on and report on each other. Tibetan monks and nuns responded to this intrusive and repressive surveillance system with self-immolations, hoping that Xi Jinping would adopt a softer policy towards the tar. Instead, Xi continued Hu’s approach. He maintained a hardline stance and stepped up efforts to indoctrinate Tibetans, separate families, and monitor and control monastic life. And he imposed additional restrictions on travel within and outside Tibet. Security forces in the tar often resort to violent means to suppress and punish what the ccp perceives as political dissent.
Xinjiang 新疆, literally the new frontier, was a region that was permanently conquered, consolidated, and colonized under the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). The administrative handling of this region varied between the fall of the dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. After being incorporated into the prc in 1955, it became a so-called autonomous region, xuar, like Tibet. The ccp continued the settler colonialism of the Qing with even more migration of Han Chinese into the region and systematic exploitation of natural resources through its Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (xpcc, bing tuan 兵团).
The ccp had always viewed the Uyghurs as backward because of their religion, but its approach had previously been more developmental. However, repression became more visible during Hu’s tenure, especially after the 2009 riots in the capital Urumqi. Linked to the US “global war on terror” in response to the 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre, unrest in the xuar was increasingly seen as linked to the so-called “three evil forces” (三股势力): “terrorism, extremism, and separatism”. Xi later claimed that Islamic extremism had infected large parts of Uighur society and driven them into terrorism. This view led to a push for various counter-terrorism measures, including the implementation of surveillance measures that even exceeded those in Tibet. Chen Quanguo was again in control, having since moved from Tibet to become Party Secretary of Xinjiang (2016-2021). Under the alleged threat of counter-terrorism, more than a million Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples of the region disappeared; they were detained without due process in so-called re-education camps. These facilities were found to be linked to elaborate and extensive forced labor systems. Chen was replaced in 2021; the ad hoc nature of the detention and “re-education” campaign gave way to the institutionalization of repression. In 2022, the UN described the situation in Xinjiang as cultural genocide.
The crackdown on Chinese human rights lawyers
Document No. 9 was followed by a nationwide coordinated crackdown (also known as 709) on Chinese human rights lawyers on July 9, 2015. This crackdown resulted in the detention of 300 (human) rights lawyers and other legal professionals. At least fifteen of them have been charged with criminal offenses. Lawyers and professionals have been placed under rsdl (residential surveillance at a designated location), detained, disappeared, and even forced to confess on Chinese television. They have also been threatened, beaten, and tortured in extra-legal secret detention centers (so-called black jails, hei jianyu 黑监狱) despite China’s ratification of the un Convention against Torture (cat). Similar procedures have been imposed on those who have spoken out publicly on their behalf — a retaliation by the Chinese government. As a result of retaliatory measures, the true extent of violence against human rights lawyers, defenders, and other legal professionals may be much less known.
Lawyers and legal professionals have been an essential layer of support for China’s oppressed, such as ethnic minorities, religious practitioners, or imprisoned journalists, and have challenged government abuses. As advocates for the Chinese people and civil society, they are seen by the ccp as a threat to social stability that must be contained. Therefore, in addition to organized crackdowns, the ccp uses basic control measures such as threatening lawyers with the suspension or revocation of their or their firm’s license.
Repression continues to this day. Most recently, in 2023, Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi, who advocated for better civil rights, were charged with “subversion of state power.”
The control over Chinese higher education
The various threats that Document No. 9 defined also had a significant impact on Chinese higher education as an extension of the Chinese government. Under Xi Jinping, they now must serve the government’s purposes exclusively.
Obviously linked to Document No. 9 is the crackdown on “Western values,” which extended to campuses and universities as early as 2015. It substantially stifled open debates in the classroom.
Since Xi’s first term, Chinese university professors have been fired or had their contracts terminated for publicly questioning or criticizing the Party, Mao Zedong, or Chinese society on the social media platform Weibo. Other professors have been reported by their students for not toeing the official Party line or for being too “Western.” Milder cases of mere “inappropriate remarks” resulted in a reprimand. Some were investigated further; others lost their Party membership. The cases involved a wide range of universities, from the highly prestigious Peking, Tsinghua, and Fudan universities and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to Xiamen University and more inland institutions such as Hubei or Guizhou University.
According to a database maintained by Scholars at Risk, there have been a total of 118 cases of university professors being punished since 2012. Several of these cases involve scholars from Xinjiang. Punishments ranged from travel restrictions (12) and loss of position (23) to more severe measures; fourteen were prosecuted, and 51 were imprisoned.
The control of foreign ngos
The introduction of the Overseas ngo Law (2016) can also be interpreted from the perspective of curbing “Western influence.” Since the introduction of the law, overseas ngos have either left the country or had to shift their activities to non-politically sensitive areas. Of the estimated 7,000 overseas ngos present in China at the time of the law’s introduction in early 2017, only 707 are now registered with the Ministry. There has been an observable shift in activities. Previously, overseas ngos also focused on political issues, such as labor and gender issues, or legal and government reform. But now, they are only allowed to work in areas sanctioned by the state. As a result, non-political issues such as education, poverty alleviation, youth, and health issues now dominate their activities (Holbig & Lang, 2022).
The control of national ngos and activism
There are two types of civic ngos in China: service-oriented ngos (welfare and services for disadvantaged groups) and advocacy ngos (law reform/change through legal means and mass mobilization). The latter type has faced increasing restrictions since the early 2000s. However, although there were crackdowns under Hu, there was no systematic approach to cracking down on ngos. Moreover, many ngos were not officially registered with the state as social organizations, which, similar to the Overseas ngo Law (2017), required the support of a government agency as a professional supervisor of the ngo’s activities (dual administration system). Many were registered, if at all, only as business entities.
All this has changed dramatically under Xi. He abolished the dual administration system and introduced a direct registration system based on four categories of social organizations. But this turned out to be a sorting mechanism to separate “official” ngos from “unofficial” ones. Those that became official ngos were essentially co-opted, as they had to adjust their agendas to the government’s preferences, change their sources of funding, and could no longer work with those that were not registered.
In 2014, in the wake of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong’s Occupy Central Movement, ngos were increasingly seen as anti-government organizations and instruments of Western interference to undermine the party-state. From the ccp’s perspective, ngos posed a threat to regime stability. As the government shifted to a greater focus on national security, both service and advocacy ngos were criminalized on a large scale. They were cut off from foreign funding, a major source of their income, and targeted for punishment under various offenses. These were catch-all offenses, such as “illegal business operation”, “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” and “gathering a crowd to disturb the public order”. Their broad definitions invited an arbitrary and self-serving use by Chinese authorities, allowing for sentences of up to five years.
The suppression of independent journalism and media
In the early days of the Covid pandemic in China, several Chinese individuals emerged and reported on Covid from the ground in Wuhan, independently of the Chinese state media. There were at least four so-called “citizen journalists”: Fang Bin, Chen Qiushi, Li Zehua, and Zhang Zhan. Fang Bin and Zhang Zhan were detained and sentenced to three and four years imprisonment, respectively, under the blanket charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Zhang Zhan also went on hunger strike several times in protest at her sentence. Chen disappeared and was placed under surveillance for some time after his reappearance. Li was allowed to leave China in 2021.
Outlook
For a while, it seemed that China was on the road to greater economic and social liberalization. However, these early signs slowly turned into wishful thinking under Hu Jintao. Under Xi Jinping, this trajectory has become entirely illusory. Originally seen as an advocate of reform, while reform was equated by many with continued liberalization, he has sweepingly rolled back those prevailing freedoms under the banner of national security. The survival of the party and “socialist” ideology is all that matters to him.
In China, where Xi’s socialism is the only “religion,” religious communities are not only suppressed but continually indoctrinated and re-educated to “fit in” with their Han Chinese environment. They are also exploited as cheap labor in internment camps to serve China’s faltering economy. The situation in Chinese universities today is more reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution: students are indoctrinated with “patriotic education” while denouncing and punishing their own teachers.
The space for ngo activity in China is shrinking. Advocacy and especially activism in areas related to government affairs, such as lgtbqi+, labor, and consumer issues, have been effectively silenced. The role of existing ngos has increasingly shifted to that of service providers according to government preferences.
There is little independent reporting in China. Citizens who engage in such reporting or disseminate such findings online inevitably face varying degrees of repression, including detention.
The outlook is, therefore, bleak. Even if Xi gives way to a new generation of leaders, the goal of “securitizing everything” is unlikely to change without a major ideological shift (Drinhausen & Legarda, 2022).
References
ChinaFile. (2013). Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation. China File.
Drinhausen, K., y Legarda, H. (2022). «Comprehensive National Security» unleashed: How Xi’s approach shapes China’s policies at home and abroad. Merics.
FIDH. (2016). Dangers of China’s counter-terrorism law for Tibetans and Uyghurs. FIDH.
Holbig, H., y Lang, B. (2022). China’s Overseas ngo Law and the Future of International Civil Society. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 52(4), 574-601.
Shirk, S. (2018). China in Xi’s ‘New Era’: The Return to Personalistic Rule. Journal of Democracy, 29(2), 22-36.
Tanner, M. S. (2017). Beijing’s New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense. Lawfare.Zhu, H., y Jun, L. (2022). The Crackdown on Rights-advocacy ngos in Xi’s China: Politicizing the Law and Legalizing the Repression. Journal of Contemporary China, 31(136), 518-538.
